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Abstract 
This study analyzes the impact of merger and acquisition financing method on buyer 
cumulative abnormal returns. The model builds on findings in previous literature by 
including deal structure variables, company variables, industry variables, time variables, 
and post-acquisition announcement return data from 2000 to 2018. The analysis does not 
find a statistically significant relationship between cash plus debt/stock financing and 
cumulative abnormal returns. However, significant coefficients for buyer and target 
industry suggest that deal structure varies and ultimately effects cumulative abnormal 
returns within specific industries. Additionally, significant results for buyer profitability 
and time variables provide insight on how the financial market interprets synergy 
realization and economic crises in relation to security valuation and the mergers and 
acquisitions market. 
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1. Introduction  
Firms engage in a wide variety of economic activity including shrinking, 
expanding, and restructuring all for the purposes of corporate development and adding 
value (Matos, 2001). Mergers and acquisitions play a vital role in this process and allow 
firms to strengthen operations, penetrate new markets, consolidate assets, and obtain 
human capital and intellectual property. In 2004 alone, over 30,000 mergers and 
acquisitions were completed globally, equating to roughly one transaction every 18 
minutes (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006). The total value of these transactions was 
approximately $1,900 billion dollars, a figure which exceeds the GDP for several of the 
world’s larger countries. The frequency of mergers and acquisitions has increased in the 
past decade with approximately 50,000 completed transactions globally in 2018, 
amounting to a total value in excess of $3,900 billion dollars (Institute of Mergers, 
Acquisitions, and Alliances). With the deployment of large amounts of capital and the 
potential for significant additive value, it is important to analyze the ways in which the 
merger and acquisition market is financed by the buyer.   
Previous literature has revealed that companies utilizing stock as a primary 
component for their deal structure experience negative post acquisition returns. Deal 
structures that heavily rely on stock is an indication to the market that the buyer’s stock is 
overvalued (Myers and Majluf, 1984). The inherent disparity of quality of information 
between the buyer and the target creates an environment where “information asymmetry” 
can impact acquisition deal structure and buyer returns (Wansley et al., 1987). 
Furthermore, buyers that primarily pay with cash are associated with positive abnormal 
returns.  
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This paper aims to analyze the impact of merger and acquisition financing 
methods on buyer cumulative abnormal returns. Controlling for buyer and target industry 
allows the model to perform a specific analysis on how financing methods differ across 
business sectors and how the financial market perceives the effectiveness of the deal 
structure. Additionally, this analysis incorporates an updated set of data to improve upon 
prior writings. 
 The hypothesis of this paper intends to test the results found in previous literature 
which theorize that stock financed acquisitions are significantly responsible for buyer’s 
negative return. However, the analysis of this model presents insignificant results in 
relation to the significant conclusions reached in prior economic literature. Once the 
buyer and target industry are controlled for, transaction variables for percent of cash and 
percent of stock within the acquisition deal do not have a statistically significant impact 
on cumulative abnormal returns. Instead, the significant results for specific buyer and 
target industries suggest that acquisition deal structure differs across industry and that 
industry explains cumulative abnormal returns rather than the composition of the deal 
structure. Negative and significant results for the profitability of the buyer reveal that the 
financial market perceives integration risk as outweighing the potential marginal revenue 
or cost synergies of an acquisition. Additionally, significant results regarding the year of 
acquisition provide insight on how the market evaluates economic crisis and political 
climate in relation to the merger and acquisition market. 
The following section will discuss the results of previous economic literature. 
Section 3 examines the data incorporated in the model. Section 4 discusses the empirical 
strategy used to analyze the relationship between financing method and cumulative 
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abnormal returns and presents the results of the model. Section 5 interprets the results and 
provides the conclusions.  
 
2.   Literature Review  
Can systematic financing structures give firms a competitive advantage when 
undertaking an acquisition? In a model without taxes, Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
discover that a firm’s market value is derived completely independent of the firm’s 
capital structure and the firm’s decision regarding how to finance its investment. While 
this empirical observation may hold in theory, arguably corporate tax laws within the 
economy should have a measurable impact on the financing structures used in 
acquisitions. Typically, cash acquisitions create an immediate liability in the form of a 
capital gains tax for the target’s shareholders, while equity financing defers tax liabilities 
until the new shares are sold (Amihud et al., 1990). However, empirical evidence has 
been mixed and unable to detail a clear and statistically significant relationship between 
tax implications and debt/equity financing methods. For example, Carleton et al. (1983) 
show that for target companies with lower dividend payout ratios and lower book-to-
market ratios, the probability of being acquired through cash financing is higher relative 
to an acquisition based on an exchange of securities. In theory, their conclusion 
contradicts the proposition that a beneficial tax savings effect is realized through higher 
depreciation costs associated with higher market-to-book ratios, further calling into 
question the empirical benefits of financing design (Carleton et al., 1983).   
 Instead of analyzing tax law implications, Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990) aim 
to address how corporate control pre- and post- acquisition affects a company’s 
 9 
investment structure. Their results reveal that stock financed acquisitions are associated 
with statistically significant negative two-day abnormal returns. They also conclude that 
firms possessing low managerial ownership are more likely to be associated with 
negative abnormal returns. Additionally, the significant results further support the 
hypothesis that as managerial ownership stakes of the acquiring firm increase, 
acquisitions are more likely to be executed through cash financing relative to stock 
exchanges (Martin, 1996). These results also align with the findings of Myers and Majluf 
(1984) who conclude that managers prefer financing through a stock exchange if they 
believe that their stock is overvalued. Similarly, Myers and Majluf (1984) show that 
acquiring investors often anticipate the stock financing preferences of target managers 
and subsequently drive down the value of firms that issue new equity in order to benefit 
from cash/debt financing. This phenomenon is well documented and referred to as 
“information asymmetry” wherein one party possesses superior private information 
relative to their acquisition counterpart (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  
Wansley et al. (1987) examine the relationship between financing structure, 
information asymmetry, and abnormal returns upon acquisition announcement. If the 
financial market and investors had access to all private information and possessed the 
ability to perfectly incorporate private information into security valuation, then capital 
markets would be more efficient (Healy and Palepu, 2001); thus, Wansley et al. presume 
the existence of abnormal returns to represent the effects of private information. The 
results conclude that stock financed acquisitions are associated with lower abnormal 
returns. Specifically, seller shareholders in cash acquisitions experience 33% abnormal 
returns compared to 17% abnormal returns in security financed acquisitions. The 
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observed relationship between abnormal returns and financing method is also consistent 
with the signaling hypothesis that proposes that financing an acquisition through a 
common stock exchange conveys negative information that the bidding firm is 
overvalued.  Furthermore, Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1987) and Huang and Walking 
(1987) support these conclusions and show that higher abnormal returns for target firms 
are associated with cash financing.    
The previous literature includes shortcomings with regards to the lack of specific 
industry control variables, and therefore the significant deal structure variables may only 
exist within a certain sector despite appearing to represent all acquisitions. A comparative 
analysis of acquisitions including variables for buyer and target industry allows this 
model to isolate and evaluate the more nuanced relationship between financing structure 
and abnormal returns. Including merger and acquisition data covering the last two 
decades also provides an updated analysis on the market’s perception of deal structure. 
 
3. Data  
3.1 Transaction and Company Data 
 Merger and acquisition data is collected from Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ for 
transactions with an announcement date between the 1/1/2000 to 12/31/2018 time period. 
Capital IQ is an ideal data source for the model’s analysis as it provides detailed 
transaction information for mergers and acquisitions while also providing financial 
information regarding the specific targets and acquirers involved in the transactions. 
Capital IQ does not provide detailed information regarding the acquirer’s post-acquisition 
announcement abnormal return; therefore, the data from Capital IQ is cross-referenced 
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with the corresponding cumulative abnormal return variable that is collected from the 
Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS). In order to obtain statistics regarding security 
cumulative abnormal return, the data sample is initially restricted to acquisitions 
involving public buyers. 
In order to control for legal discrepancies present in cross border mergers and 
acquisitions, the sample is restricted to include transactions between target and acquiring 
companies with headquarters located within the United States. Furthermore, the sample 
strictly includes friendly mergers and acquisitions due to the fact that hostile takeovers 
are subject to additional governmental regulation and can negatively influence the 
acquirer’s return (Servaes, 1991 and Rosengren, 1987). Mergers and acquisitions data is 
additionally restricted to include closed transactions to ensure that the model is analyzing 
completed deals. For the purpose of isolating and analyzing distinctive acquisition 
financing structures across business sectors, primary industry classifications of the target 
and acquirer include: energy, real estate, materials, industrials, consumer discretionary, 
consumer staples, health care, financials, information technology, communication 
services, and utilities. These restrictions yield a sample size of 2,753 successful domestic 
mergers and acquisitions. The sample of 2,753 is further reduced to include transactions 
in which both the target and acquirer report complete financial data for the model’s 
explanatory variables. This creates an initial sample size of 478 transactions obtained 
from the Capital IQ source. While the sample window time frame is 18 years, the initial 
sample is relatively small due to the fact that observations had to be removed for those 
transactions that Capital IQ did not provide data for company control characteristics at 
the time of the announcement. 
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Individual company characteristics are included as explanatory and control 
variables in order to examine the impact of debt capacity, size, relative size, valuation, 
and profitability on transaction structure and abnormal returns. Accordingly, in order to 
gain an objective analysis of acquisition financing structure, it is necessary to control for 
the financial characteristics of both the target and acquirer. Previous literature has 
revealed that cash acquisitions are typically financed through the use of additional 
borrowing and impact the buyer’s capital structure; ultimately, discrepancies between 
pre/post acquisition capital structure can influence the buyer’s return and financing 
preference (Wansley et al., 1983). Definitions and summary statistics for all company 
characteristics are included in Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2 in the appendix. 
Exhibit 3 in the appendix provides details regarding the number of transactions 
relative to industry sector. The target industry with the most transactions is financials 
with 244 acquisitions, amounting to roughly 63% of the total transactions within the 
sample. The information technology group is responsible for the second largest number 
of transactions with 49 observations, amounting to roughly 13% of the total transactions 
within the sample. The sample also contains 26 acquisitions in which the target and 
acquirer do not operate within the same industry, approximately 7%, whereas 
acquisitions within the same industry total 362 observations, approximately 93%. 
Additionally, Exhibit 4 in the appendix provides a breakdown of total transaction value 
ranges and indicates an average transaction value of $1,552.91 million dollars, with 
roughly 39% of the sample falling under the $100 million-dollar threshold. 
Previous literature suggests that post-acquisition security return is significantly 
impacted by merger and acquisition transaction characteristics. Thus, transaction 
 13 
characteristics are the primary explanatory variables and are isolated to measure the 
significance of financial deal structure. “Total Cash Percent of Consideration” represents 
the portion of cash used by the acquirer in the transaction structure; “Total Cash” is the 
total value of cash used by the acquirer. “Total Debt Percent of Consideration” represents 
the portion of debt used by the acquirer in the transaction structure; “Total Debt” is the 
total value of debt used by the acquirer. “Total Stock Percent of Consideration” 
represents the portion of stock or equity used by the acquirer in the transaction structure; 
“Total Stock” is the total value of stock or equity used by the acquirer. “Total Preferred 
Percent of Consideration” represents the portion of preferred stock used by the acquirer 
in the transaction structure; “Total Preferred” is total value of preferred stock used by the 
acquirer. “Total Rights/Warrants/Options Percent of Consideration” represents the 
portion of rights/warrants/options used by acquirer in the transaction structure; “Total 
Rights/Warrants/Options” is the total value of rights/warrants/options used by the 
acquirer.  “Total Hybrid Percent of Consideration” represents the portion of hybrid 
securities used by the acquirer in the transaction structure; “Total Hybrid” is the total 
value of hybrid securities used by the acquirer. 
Exhibit 5 in the appendix details the relative usage of financial instruments within 
the acquisition transaction; interpreting the results, an average transaction in the sample is 
comprised of 36% cash and 63% stock. The average acquisition in the sample is 
primarily supported by cash and stock transactions. However, percentage of cash and 
percentage of stock have the same standard deviation of 39%, indicating that cash stock 
are employed in transactions on an equally consistent basis around the respective mean 
values. Lastly, with a mean of 0.6%, the percentage of debt is responsible for the third 
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largest financing allocation. The percentage of preferred stock and 
rights/warrants/options do not report a mean value above 0.5%, displaying the minimal 
extent to which they are utilized by acquiring companies. Hybrid securities do not report 
even a single use in financing structure for the transactions within the sample. Due to the 
low number of transactions supported by hybrid, preferred, and rights/warrants/options, 
percent of cash plus percent of debt and percent of stock are the only transaction 
variables included in the model’s analysis. 
Exhibit 6 in the appendix addresses the value of financial instruments within the 
acquisition transaction. Interpreting the results, the average transaction is comprised of 
approximately $252 million dollars of cash financing and $1,156 million dollars of stock 
financing. Relative to value of stock, the value of cash financing has a smaller standard 
deviation, $1,288 million dollars compared to $5,555 million dollars, indicating that the 
value of cash is employed in transactions more consistently around the mean of $1,288 
million dollars while the value of stock fluctuates to a greater degree around the mean 
value of $5,555 million dollars. The third most significant transaction variable in terms of 
value is total preferred stock, which has a mean of $1.8 million dollars and a large 
standard deviation of $33 million dollars. However, preferred stock is only used in two 
transactions within the sample and highlights the infrequent usage as a financing tool for 
buyers. Similarly, the fourth most significant transaction variable in terms of value is 
total debt which has a mean of $1 million dollars and a standard deviation of $11 million 
dollars. The mean values for total hybrid and total rights/warrants/options are effectively 
$0, once again emphasizing that acquisition transaction value is primarily comprised of 
cash and stock financing.  
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3.2 Cumulative Abnormal Return Data 
 The model’s response variable is measured by the acquiring company’s 
cumulative abnormal returns. Cumulative abnormal return is defined as the sum of the 
differences between the expected return on a security and the actual return of the security 
as determined by the market (Nasdaq Financial Glossary). Controlling for transaction and 
company characteristics, cumulative abnormal return is the ideal dependent variable as it 
allows the model to measure the security’s financial gain over a specific time period in 
relation to the acquisition financing structure and market valuation.  
Once transaction data was collected from Capital IQ, the acquirer’s stock ticker 
symbol and transaction date were entered into the WRSD database in order to obtain the 
according cumulative abnormal return. Prior to collecting data, parameters were instituted 
to accurately estimate cumulative abnormal return. The applied parameters include an 
estimation window, a minimum number of valid returns, an estimation gap, the start of 
event window, and the end of the event window. The estimation window is equal to 180 
days and describes the length of the period, in trading days, used to measure the expected 
return and residual return variance. The minimum number of valid returns is equal to 90 
observations and represents the minimum observations within the estimation window 
used to calculate expected return. The estimation gap is equal to 50 days and outlines the 
number of trading days between the estimation window and the beginning of the event 
window; the estimation gap is used to reduce the possibility that the risk model 
estimations are impacted by the event-induced return variance (Wharton Research Data 
Services). The event window begins 10 days prior to the acquisition announcement and 
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concludes 10 days after the acquisition announcement. Implementing the estimation 
parameters, WRDS calculates abnormal returns in excess of the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) Value-Weighted Market Return using the Market-Adjusted 
Model and assuming a market beta of 1. 
To begin, observations including two or more primary buyers had to be removed 
from the sample due to the fact that Capital IQ does not provide specific data regarding 
which party incurs the financing costs of acquisition. Therefore, the principal 
independent transaction variables cannot accurately correspond with a security’s 
cumulative abnormal return. Next, transactions in which the primary buyer’s stock is 
traded on foreign exchanges, such as The Toronto Stock Exchange, Over-The-Counter 
Market, and The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited, were removed because of the 
lack of a cumulative abnormal return output from WRSD. Acquisitions in which the 
buyer had not engaged in an initial public offering prior to the transaction date had be 
excluded due to the inability to estimate cumulative abnormal returns. Lastly, 
transactions were excluded in which WRSD could not generate corresponding cumulative 
abnormal returns. Throughout this process, 90 observations were removed and this yields 
a final sample size of 388 transactions. The characteristics of the removed observations 
do not create a bias within the data sample as the removed observations are not 
concentrated within a specific industry or subgroup. However, a characteristic of the final 
data set that raises interest is the fact that a total of 6 separate transactions are announced 
by the same acquirer on the same day. The multiple acquisition announcements share an 
identical estimation window and could jointly be impacting the buyer’s cumulative 
abnormal return, thus making it difficult to discern the true effects of a singular and 
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distinct financing structure. However, expressed as a percentage, the 6 transactions 
amount to roughly 1.5% of the final sample and, therefore, raise minimal concern in 
terms of adding bias to measuring the effects on cumulative abnormal returns. 
 
4. Empirical Strategy and Results 
 For the purposes of analyzing buyer cumulative abnormal returns, the model uses 
an ordinary least square (OLS) linear regression. Specifically, Equation 1 is estimated 
below: (1)																																							𝛾!" = 	𝛼 + 𝛽#𝑇𝑅𝐴!"	 + 𝛽%𝐴𝐶𝑄!" + 𝛽&𝑇𝐴𝑅!" + 𝜂'()*+, + 𝜂'()-*. + 𝜀!"	 	
 
where 𝛾 is the buyer’s cumulative abnormal return, i and t represent the acquired firm and 
time respectively. Furthermore, TRA is a vector of transaction financing methods, ACQ 
is a vector of acquirer business characteristics, TAR is a vector of target business 
characteristics, 𝜂 represents the acquirer and target industry respectively, and 𝜀 is an error 
term with the usual properties. Financing characteristics only include percent of cash plus 
debt and percent of stock financing due to relatively infrequent use of hybrid securities, 
preferred stock, rights/warrants/options. Empirically, the model assumes that successful 
acquisitions can be executed using any combination of financing methods in terms of 
both value and percent. 
For the acquirer, company control variables include net debt/market 
capitalization, total assets, market capitalization/net income, and net income/revenue. Net 
debt divided by market capitalization is included as a variable because it controls for the 
relative debt capacity for the acquirer that can ultimately impact the acquirer’s financing 
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decision. Total assets measures the relative size of the company, which in turn impacts 
the acquirer’s ability to generate cash and secure debt loans. Market capitalization 
divided by net income controls for the acquirer’s stock valuation. Net income divided by 
revenue controls for the acquirer’s profitability and cash generation.  
Company control variables for the target include total assets of the acquirer/total 
assets of the target, net debt/market capitalization, and net income/total revenue. Total 
assets of the acquirer divided by total assets of the target is included in order to measure 
the relative size of the target. Discrepancy in size between the target and acquirer may 
impact the acquirer’s financing decision and must therefore be controlled. Net debt 
divided by market cap is included as a variable because it measures the target’s level of 
financial distress. Depending on the financial distress of the target, the target may be less 
willing to negotiate a financial package from the acquirer and would therefore approve an 
acquisition method that is less than ideal. Similarly, net income divided by total revenue 
controls for the target’s profitability and cash generation.  
The regression includes the complete data set with 388 observations; thus, the 
data includes transactions across all of the target industry categories except consumer 
staples. The model includes dummy variables for buyer and target industry in order to 
control for fixed financing effects within the sub-groups. The model also includes 
dummy variables for year of acquisition in order to control for time fixed effects.  
 Exhibit 7 in the appendix provides the regression output. Interpreting the results 
in Column 1, percent of cash plus debt and percent of stock are not statistically 
significant. Therefore, the complexion of the financial package offered by the bidders 
does not significantly impact bidder return.  
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 The first variable that is statistically significant is the acquirer’s profitability as 
measured by net income divided by revenue. The coefficient is significant at the 1% level 
and implies that there is less than a 1% chance that the regression results are the result of 
a random distribution. A unit increase in the acquirer’s profit margin leads to a 2.52% 
decrease in cumulative abnormal returns; furthermore, the results are unanticipated in that 
the coefficient for the acquirer’s profitability is negative. 
 Transaction value is also negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. The 
negative coefficient implies that a unit increase in transaction value decreases the 
acquirer’s cumulative abnormal return by 2.34%.  
 Target industry dummy variables for financials and materials are both statistically 
significant. The negative coefficient for financials is statistically significant at the 1% 
level and implies that acquirers targeting the financials industry experience a 67.8% 
lower cumulative abnormal return. The negative coefficient for materials is statistically 
significant at the 10% level and implies that acquirers targeting the materials industry 
experience a 20.7% lower cumulative abnormal return. 
 Acquirer industry dummy variables for financials, industrials, and information 
technology are also statistically significant. The positive coefficient for financials is 
statistically significant at the 1% level and implies that acquirers operating within the 
financials industry experience a 54% higher cumulative abnormal return. The negative 
coefficient for industrials is statistically significant at the 10% level and implies that 
acquirers operating within the industrials industry experience a 11.4% lower cumulative 
abnormal return. The negative coefficient for information technology is statistically 
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significant at the 1% level and implies that acquirers operating within the information 
technology industry experience a 20.7% lower cumulative abnormal return. 
 Dummy variables for the acquisition year in 2009, 2010, and 2013 are all 
statistically significant. The negative coefficient for year 2009 is statistically significant 
at the 1% level and implies that acquirers in 2009 experience a 16.7% lower cumulative 
abnormal return. The positive coefficient for year 2010 is statistically significant at the 
5% level and implies that acquirers in 2010 experience a 37.8% higher cumulative 
abnormal return. The positive coefficient for year 2013 is statistically significant at the 
10% level and implies that acquirers in 2013 experience an 8.23% higher cumulative 
abnormal return.   
 
5. Conclusion 
5.1 Transaction Variables 
 This paper provides an analysis of the impact of cash, stock, preferred, and debt 
acquisition financing methods on cumulative abnormal returns. However, the lack of 
significant coefficients for all transaction variables conflicts with previous literature 
theorizing that stock financed acquisitions, relative to cash financed acquisitions, are 
associated with lower cumulative abnormal returns. Myers and Majluf (1984) and 
Wansley et al. (1987) both detail a significant relationship between information 
asymmetry, financing method, and abnormal returns. Additionally, these results align 
with the signaling hypothesis which states that stock financed acquisitions convey 
negative information that the acquiring firm is overvalued, and thus the financial market 
tends to react negatively to stock financing. Moreover, Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1987) 
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and Huang and Walking (1987) find evidence to support the implications of information 
asymmetry and the signaling hypothesis and conclude that higher abnormal returns are 
associated with target firms which utilize cash financing. Once buyer/target industry is 
accounted for, the lack of significant results for percent of cash plus debt and percent of 
stock ultimately emphasize the significant results for buyer/target industry characteristics. 
The findings of previous literature are valid, but the model’s industry control variables 
reveal that it is buyer/target industry that explains cumulative abnormal returns rather 
than deal structure. 
 
5.2 Industry Variables 
The significance of both financial targets and financial acquirers provides further 
economic context for previous literature and the model’s analysis. Berger et al. (1995) 
study the motivations behind banking mergers and introduce the “consolidation 
hypothesis”; under the consolidation hypothesis, mergers between banks are strongly 
motivated by the transfer or consolidation of financial assets. Moore (1997) supports this 
hypothesis and confirms that financial acquisitions serve to transfer assets under poor 
management to the acquirer for the purposes of redeploying the assets under better 
management. Similarly, in the financials industry, revenue streams are typically 
dependent on interests/fees and costs are dependent on human capital. Thus, mergers and 
acquisitions within the financials industry are not inspired by potential revenue and cost 
synergies. The financial market may conclude that financial acquirers are obtaining assets 
for the purposes of restructuring, exploiting undervalued assets or growing an asset pool,  
and then associate these acquisitions with positive cumulative abnormal returns. 
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However, it is also important to consider the negative cumulative abnormal returns 
associated with acquisitions in which the target operates within the financials industry. If 
the target is not properly managing an asset pool and aims for an acquisition, this would 
indicate that target is under financial distress. The financial market may, accordingly, 
associate the acquisition of a target within the financials industry with the acquisition of a 
company under financial distress and a potential loss of value for the acquirer. 
Nonetheless, this would not explain why an acquirer would voluntarily import 
unnecessary financial distress through the acquisition of a target within the financials 
industry.  
Another possible explanation for the positive abnormal returns is the typically 
high valuation associated with financial firms relative to historical benchmarks. Using a 
sample of commercial banks, Flannery and James (1984) find a negative correlation 
between the change in interest rate and common stock returns. Additionally, Forbes and 
Mayne (1989) conclude that as the banks’ prime rate increases, as measured by the 
difference between the interest rate and the banks’ lending rate, then the stock 
performance of the banks increases. The past two decades have been an ideal 
environment for increasing the banks’ prime rate due to the fact that interest rates have 
been relatively low compared to historical trends (Economic Research Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis). Therefore, financial firms carry a relatively high valuation compared 
to alternative sectors due to the benefits of a low interest rate environment. With higher 
valuations, financial firms are likely to implement stock in their acquisition structure to a 
greater degree relative to other industries. Moreover, financial buyers rarely deviate from 
financial industry acquisitions and, in fact, 243 out of the 244 financial targets were 
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acquired by financial buyers in the sample. This, in turn, explains why financing method 
is not significant once industry is controlled for, while the industry for both financial 
buyers and financial targets is statistically significant.  
Similarly, the significant results for buyers operating with the information 
technology industry are likely due to the high valuation associated with technology firms. 
Technology has the largest market capitalization across all industries and possess high 
growth potential with possibilities extending to the cloud storage, big data, and mobile 
computing (Fidelity Sector Investing). Technology has been rapidly integrated into all 
aspects of the economy and almost every business sector benefits from the 
implementation of technology. Diverse integration and high growth potential therefore 
cause technology firms to be highly valued relative to alternative industries. With a 
relatively high valuation, technology firms are more likely to implement stock in the 
acquisition structure, thus causing buyer industry for information technology to be 
statistically significant.  
Negative cumulative abnormal returns associated with acquirers operating within 
the information technology industry may also be a result of the high risk associated with 
the integration process of high technology products. Chakrabari et al. (1994) state that the 
integration of the target’s technology or knowledge base is extremely arduous and creates 
additional complexities for the buyer’s innovation process. Additionally, Cloot et al. 
(2006) analyze the impact of acquisitions on the innovative performance for high 
technology firms and conclude that while the target’s technological knowledge provides a 
positive effect in the first few years post acquisition, the effects eventually switch and 
negatively impact the innovative performance of the buyer.  
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Technology and financial acquisitions are responsible for approximately 76% of 
the acquisitions within the sample. Therefore, the regression results suggest that 
financing structure may have a statistically significant impact on abnormal returns for 
specific technology and financial acquisitions; however, once the buyer and target’s 
industry is controlled for, financing structure is not significant, while industry is 
significant. 
The acquisitions regarding buyers in the industrials industry and targets in the 
materials industry have not been extensively studied in previous literature and do not 
provide direct aid in interpreting the results of my model. However, on a macroeconomic 
level, industrials/materials firms are typically more sensitive to economic cycles and 
commodity pricing (Fidelity Sector Investing); in comparison to technology firms, 
industrials/materials firms are associated with lower growth rates and subsequently lower 
valuations. This would decrease the likeliness of acquisitions within both industries to be 
executed through stock financing. By nature of the sectors and a shared asset-heavy 
business model, industrials/materials firms also historically possess large asset bases. A 
larger asset base in the form of collateral would in theory increase the firm’s ability to 
secure debt and access cash. Therefore industrials/materials firms are likely to acquire or 
be acquired by cash financing methods and this result is reflected in the significant 
industry coefficients once industry control variables are introduced. 
 
5.3 Buyer Variables 
 The significant negative coefficient for profit margin also provides a compelling 
interpretation. Post-acquisition operating performance has been analyzed by many 
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economic researchers, yet a consensus has not been reached regarding the significance of 
operational improvements. Evaluating acquisitions in the early 1980’s, Healy et al. 
(1992) find evidence that merged firms show significant improvements in asset 
productivity and subsequent cash flow generation. Furthermore, they conclude that there 
is strong and positive relationship between post-merger increases in operating cash flow 
and positive abnormal returns at the time of the acquisition announcement. Switzer 
(1996) confirms these results and finds that operating performance is significantly 
increased by corporate acquisitions. Additionally, evidence of positive abnormal returns 
at the announcement date associated with operating improvements suggests that the 
financial market anticipates operating synergies upon acquisitions.     
However, Ghosh (2001) suggests that previous literature has historically 
measured performance improvements relative to industry-median firms. Typically, 
acquirers are larger than industry-median firms and plan acquisitions around periods of 
superior performance (Penman, 1991, Frank and Harris, 1989). Thus, previous results are 
likely to create bias as the regression intercept may be impacted by nonrandom errors 
caused by temporary/permanent differences in prior performance measurements between 
the acquirer and its industry counterparts (Powell and Stark, 2001). Ghosh (2001) 
addresses this suspected bias by using performance and size matched firm benchmarks 
and does not find any evidence that operating performance is significantly improved by 
acquisitions; however, Ghosh (2001) does conclude that cash flows are significantly 
increased in cash financed acquisition but decrease in stock financed acquisitions. These 
results call into question the extent to which the financial market believes revenue, cost, 
and financial synergies can be realized by the buyers and reflected into security valuation. 
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As Zollo and Meier (2008) point out, actualizing post-acquisition synergies is 
heavily influenced by the success of the integration process. Revenue synergies and cross 
selling can require substantial investments through training, marketing, sales support and 
can ultimately impact the acquirer’s synergy realization rate (Zollo and Meier, 2008). 
Similarly, cost-synergies can impact the acquirer’s synergy realization by lowering the 
quality of customer service and lowering the retention rate of top salesman (Bekier and 
Shelton, 2002). Cultural differences between the target and acquirer can also impact 
revenue realization, sociocultural integration, and shareholder value for the acquiring 
firm (Stahl and Voight, 2008). As previously referenced, acquirers generally time 
transactions around periods of superior operational performance (Penman 1991, Frank 
and Harris 1989). Therefore, the financial market may conclude that firms are not likely 
to increase their operational efficiency, and may even harm their operational efficiency, if 
their profit margins are already relatively high prior to the acquisition. Essentially, the 
complexity of the integration process may be perceived as a threat to the marginal 
increase in profitability for an already profitable company. Conversely, an acquirer with a 
lower profit margin may realize relatively more significant operational benefits, and 
subsequent positive abnormal returns, through an acquisition. The significance of profit 
margin implies that the financial market evaluates revenue and cost synergies as more 
likely to be realized for acquirers with lower levels of revenue and profitability; however, 
the acquirer’s debt capacity, size, and valuation do not significantly impact cumulative 
abnormal returns. Similarly, the target’s relative size, level of financial distress, and 
profitability are not significantly considered by the financial market in the security 
valuation process. 
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5.4 Transaction Value 
Total transaction value is associated with negative coefficient of 2.34%. In order 
to prompt an acquisition, buyers must offer the target a premium over the intrinsic value 
of the firm as measured by the net present value of expected future cash flows 
independent of an acquisition (Eccles et al., 1999). Accordingly, the purchase price for 
almost every acquisition will be higher than the intrinsic value of the target firm itself. 
The financial market then evaluates the value gap between the intrinsic value of the target 
and purchase price of the buyer and subsequently adjusts security valuation. The financial 
market could thus interpret buyers in transactions with a high purchase price as less likely 
to experience the financial returns necessary to account for the purchase premium. 
 
5.5 Time Variables 
The significance of the time variables for 2009 and 2010 provide insight on the 
financial market’s evaluation of mergers and acquisitions as a result of the 2007-2008 
global financial crisis. The 2007-2008 financial crisis is the most severe since the 1930’s 
Great Depression (Helleiner, 2011). The crisis created a delayed impact on the financial 
market’s evaluation of mergers and acquisitions because the crisis initially developed in 
housing market and later resonated through various financial institutions, hedge funds, 
and insurance agencies. It began with the collapse of the housing market, which resulted 
from mortgage defaults of borrowers with low credit (Helleiner, 2011). The magnitude 
and scale of mortgage defaults quickly threatened the stability of financial institutions 
investing in mortgage-related products and possessing risk associated with the housing 
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market. Several hedge funds collapsed in early 2007, but the crisis worsened in 2008 
when one of the largest U.S. investment banks, Bear Stearns, had to be bailed out by the 
Federal Reserve Bank (Helleiner, 2011). The total collapse of market confidence was 
further exacerbated in 2008 by the financial distress of government-sponsored mortgage 
agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, and the 
bailout of the world’s largest insurance agency, American International Group. Financial 
distress within the U.S. caused domestic and international banks to reevaluate loans and 
ultimately created widespread debt crises (Helleiner, 2011). Thus, in the wake of the 
financial crisis, the financial market viewed acquisitions with great skepticism and 
pessimism. To the extent that asset valuation and the transfer of assets lie at the heart of 
all acquisitions regardless of acquisition strategy, the financial market concluded that 
asset prices in 2009 had depreciated in value due to economic distress. Therefore, 
acquisitions in 2009 are associated with negative and highly significant cumulative 
abnormal returns.  
Following the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the U.S. introduced The American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) and injected $840 billion dollars into 
the economy in order to reinstate financial stability and stimulate economic growth 
(Carley and Hyman 2014). Blinder and Zandi (2010) model the economic conditions with 
and without the stimulus package and estimate that the ARRA is responsible for 
increasing the 2010 real GDP by approximately 3.4%, decreasing the unemployment rate 
by 1.5 percentage points, and bringing approximately 2.7 million jobs to the U.S. market. 
Thus, governmental support and the injection of money into the economy sparked a 
change in the market’s outlook on asset valuations. Once again, to the extent that mergers 
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and acquisitions are simply the transfer of assets, the market favorably viewed 
acquisitions in 2010 as buyers obtaining assets at a depressed cost that were expected to 
appreciate in value. The positive and significant cumulative abnormal returns in 2010 are 
most likely due to a shift in the market’s perception of future asset valuation and less 
about an increased ability to realize revenue, cost, or financial synergies within a specific 
year. 
Significant positive abnormal returns in 2013 could be the result of President 
Obama’s 2012 reelection for U.S presidency. The Obama campaign targeted several 
fiscal priorities that included increased spending for health, energy, education, 
infrastructure, and financial support for low income families (Feldstein 2009). The 
increase in government spending would theoretically stimulate the economy for the 
following years; thus, the financial market could have interpreted the Obama reelection 
and implied future fiscal policy as having an overall positive impact on the economy and 
creating a conducive environment for mergers and acquisitions. 
 
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
My analysis and empirical model could have been enhanced and improved 
through the incorporation of additional data and additional independent/control variables. 
The primary reason for not including the proposed variables is due to a lack of data.  
Additional variables would have created a more descriptive data set, but a majority of the 
transactions would have reported multiple missing data points and the data set would not 
have been complete.  
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To begin, because the data sample strictly includes successful acquisitions, it is 
possible that the market’s reactions and buyer abnormal returns differ for acquisition 
announcements in general regardless of the deal outcome. Additionally, the model does 
not include a variable to control for target ownership. Previous literature has revealed a 
connection between managerial ownership, information asymmetry, and the financing 
decisions of acquiring firms (Martin, 1996, Myers and Majluf, 1984). Therefore, 
including corporate governance variables for the target corresponding to chief executive 
officer ownership and/or chairman ownership would have provided a more accurate 
measurement of the relationship between financing method and abnormal returns. 
Ownership variables are reported for a small portion of the sample, but even then, the 
ownership information is not necessarily reported at the time of the announcement which 
remains important for the model in terms of standardizing the variable’s measurement.  
The model also fails to account for alternative acquisition financing methods such 
as earnouts. Earnouts act as a contractual agreement between the investor and target, 
specifying payments that are to be withheld until the target achieves pre-determined post-
acquisition performance metrics (Kohers and Ang, 2000). To mitigate the risk associated 
with information asymmetry and adverse selection, investors commonly use financing 
tools such as earnouts (Datar et al., 2001). Kohers and Ang (2000) report that earnouts 
are used more frequently by investors targeting acquisitions of private companies and 
companies operating within the technology industry and industries where information 
asymmetry is typically high. Datar et al. (2001) confirm these results and conclude that 
acquirers are more likely to utilize earnout structures when targeting private firms and 
firms with high growth potential, such as the technology and service sectors. Alternative 
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financing method variables were considered as inputs for the model due to the ability to 
mitigate risk associated with information asymmetry; however, the sample lacks a 
significant number of transactions that report statistics for the amount of earnouts used 
within the deal design. 
While the original hypothesis regarding the significance of cash or stock 
financing was not confirmed, controlling for buyer and target industry characteristics 
ultimately provides insight on how deal structure is perceived by the financial market 
across industry. Future research may consider including additional data with a more 
diverse complexion of industry acquisitions in order to provide further analysis on the 
significance of industry specific financing methods. Significant results for buyer 
profitability and transaction value give insight on how the financial market evaluates risk 
associated with revenue/cost synergies and transaction premiums. Additionally, 
significant results for time variables present the financial market’s changing perception of 
financial crises and political movements and how macroeconomic trends ultimately 
impact mergers and acquisitions. 
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7. Appendix 
Exhibit 1. Variable Definitions for Company Characteristics 
Exhibit 1 provides variable definitions for acquirer/target characteristics that are 
controlled for in the regression.  
Variable Definition 
Total Revenue 
The total income from sales at the 
acquisition measured on announcement 
day  
  
Net Income 
The total revenue less cost of goods sold at 
the acquisition measured on the acquisition 
announcement day 
  
Market Capitalization 
The total market value of public shares 
outstanding measured one day before the 
acquisition announcement 
  
Size/Total Assets 
The total book value of assets at the 
acquisition measured on the announcement 
day 
  
Total Cash and Short-Term Investments  
The value of liquid assets in the form of 
cash and investments which are expected 
to be converted to cash within a year long 
time horizon measured on the acquisition 
announcement day 
  
Total Debt 
The total value of long-term debt and 
short-term debt measured on the 
acquisition announcement day 
  
Net Debt 
Total debt – total cash and short-term 
investments at the acquisition 
announcement day 
  
Debt Capacity Acquirers net debt/market capitalization 
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Price/Earnings 
Market capitalization/net income is a 
valuation metric which details the value 
per dollar the company generates as 
income at the time of the acquisition 
announcement 
  
Profitability  
Net income/total revenue or profit margin 
is a measure of profitability and the 
revenue realization rate  
  
Relative Size Acquirer total assets/Target total assets 
  
Financial Distress Target's net debt/market capitalization 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 2: Summary Statistics for Company Characteristics 
Exhibit 2 displays summary statistics for acquirer/target characteristics. 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Acquirer- Debt Capacity 0.5 0.7 -2 7 
Acquirer- Price/Earnings 7 228 -3,305 910 
Acquirer- Profitability -0.03 2 -21 0.6 
Acquirer- Size/Total Assets (mm) 27,594 110,520 12 1,246,330 
     
Target- Relative Size 58 262 0.2 3,673 
Target- Financial Distress 10 162 -2.4 3,192 
Target- Profitability -0.3 4 -70 0.55 
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Exhibit 3. Transaction Industry Breakdown 
 
Exhibit 3 describes the number and percentage of transactions which occur in the 
industry of the target company. 
 
Target Sector Number of Transactions Percent of Total 
Communication Services 8 2% 
Consumer Discretionary 8 2% 
Consumer Staples 4 1% 
Energy 21 5% 
Financials 244 63% 
Health Care 25 6% 
Industrials 20 5% 
Information Technology  49 13% 
Materials  7 2% 
Real Estate 1 0.3% 
Utilities  1 0.3% 
 
 
Exhibit 4. Transaction Value Summary Statistics 
Exhibit 4 provides summary statistics for transaction value as well as a breakdown of 
transaction value for specific ranges. 
 
Transaction Value (mm) Mean  Std. Dev.   Min.  Max. 
Transaction Value 
$1,55
3  $6,255  $0.95  $57,808  
 
Transaction Ranges (mm) Number of Transactions  Percent of Total 
Greater than $1 Billion 66 17% 
$500-$999.9 28 7% 
$100 -$499.9 144 37% 
Less than $100 150 39% 
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Exhibit 5. Transaction Variables Percent of Consideration Summary Statistics 
Exhibit 5 provides summary statistics for the percent of the financial instrument utilized in 
the transaction structure. 
 
Transaction Variable Mean  Std. Dev.  Min. Max. 
Cash % of Consideration  36% 39% 0% 100% 
Debt % of Consideration  0.6% 1% 0% 100% 
Preferred % of Consideration 0.4% 1% 0% 100% 
Stock % of Consideration  63% 39% 0% 100% 
Hybrid % of Consideration  0.0% 0% 0% 0% 
Rights/Warrants/Options % of 
Consideration 0.00001% 0.0002% 0% 0.004% 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 6. Transaction Variables Total Value Summary Statistics 
Exhibit 6 provides summary statistics for the total value of the financial instrument utilized 
in the transaction structure. 
 
Transaction Variable Mean  Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Total Cash $252 $1,288 $0 $17,816 
Total Debt  $1 $11 $0 $169 
Total Preferred $2 $33 $0 $659 
Total Stock  $1,156 $5,555 $0 $57,808 
Total Hybrid $0 $0 $0 $0 
Total Rights/Warrants/Options $0.00001 $0 $0 $0.002 
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Exhibit 7. Regression Output 
Exhibit 7 provides regression output with the cumulative abnormal returns serving as the 
dependent variable and independent variables controlling for deal structure, 
acquirer/target characteristics, transaction value, acquirer/target industry, and year. 
Column 1 presents the variables’ coefficient followed by the standard error in 
parentheses. Indicators for statistical significance are presented at the bottom of the 
exhibit. Total assets and transaction value are included in logarithmic form as a means to 
express the large discrepancy in raw values on a more convenient scale.  
 
 (1) 
Variables Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
  
% Cash + Debt -0.0118 
 (0.113) 
% Stock -0.00290 
 (0.112) 
Acquirer- Debt Capacity -0.00603 
 (0.00852) 
Acquirer- Price to Earnings 1.04e-05 
 (2.92e-05) 
Acquirer- Profitability -0.0254*** 
 (0.00413) 
Acquirer- Log. Total Assets 0.0101 
 (0.00978) 
Target- Relative Size 5.42e-07 
 (2.36e-05) 
Target- Financial Distress -1.66e-05 
 (3.33e-05) 
Target- Profitability 0.000482 
 (0.00153) 
Log. Transaction Value -0.0237** 
 (0.0112) 
Target- Consumer Discretionary -0.0186 
 (0.0738) 
Target- Consumer Staples - 
  
Target- Energy -0.0895 
 (0.129) 
Target- Financials -0.680*** 
 (0.145) 
Target- Health Care -0.00531 
 (0.0872) 
Target- Industrials 0.00416 
 (0.0626) 
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Target- Information Technology 0.0483 
 (0.0634) 
Target- Materials -0.211* 
 (0.121) 
Target- Real Estate -0.0517 
 (0.134) 
Target- Utilities -0.216 
 (0.197) 
Buyer- Consumer Discretionary -0.0555 
 (0.0733) 
Buyer- Consumer Staples -0.0694 
 (0.0718) 
Buyer- Energy 0.00621 
 (0.124) 
Buyer- Financials 0.543*** 
 (0.153) 
Buyer- Health Care -0.0632 
 (0.0845) 
Buyer- Industrials -0.110* 
 (0.0598) 
Buyer- Information Technology -0.210*** 
 (0.0614) 
Buyer- Materials 0.205 
 (0.129) 
Buyer- Real Estate - 
  
Buyer- Utilities 0.0370 
 (0.165) 
Year 2017 -0.0236 
 (0.0379) 
Year 2016 0.00224 
 (0.0382) 
Year 2015 0.0450 
 (0.0528) 
Year 2014 0.0287 
 (0.0428) 
Year 2013 0.0823* 
 (0.0490) 
Year 2012 -0.0215 
 (0.0498) 
Year 2011 0.00750 
 (0.0689) 
Year 2010 0.377** 
 (0.151) 
Year 2009 -0.168*** 
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 (0.0513) 
Year 2008 0.00575 
 (0.0533) 
Year 2007 -0.0240 
 (0.0374) 
Year 2006 0.0121 
 (0.0356) 
Year 2005 0.00170 
 (0.0344) 
Year 2004 0.00879 
 (0.0299) 
Year 2003 -0.0126 
 (0.0315) 
Year 2002 0.000251 
 (0.0311) 
Year 2001 0.0143 
 (0.0296) 
Year 2000 0.0422 
 (0.0283) 
Constant 0.152 
 (0.123) 
  
Observations 388 
R-squared 0.315 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
